Empirical Commensurability between Incommensurable Theories: The Phlogiston Case
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me1.52Keywords:
incommensurability, phlogiston theory, structural reconstruction, ontological reductionAbstract
This work constitutes an attempt to meet Kuhn’s (1976) and Feyerabend’s (1977) request, also shared by the main proponents of the structuralist metatheory, Balzer, Moulines and Sneed (1987), for a structural analysis of incommensurable theories, so that it becomes possible to formally specify and empirically support the notion of incommensurability. The paper is structured in three parts: first, the kind of theoretical entity corresponding to the phlogiston and oxygen theories is determined; second, their respective structural reconstructions are presented, and, finally, an analysis of both theories’ intertheoretical relations is developed, showing that they satisfy the definitions of weak ontological reduction and incommensurability.
References
Balzer, W., Moulines, C.U. y J.D. Sneed (1987), An Architectonic for Science. The Structuralist Program, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Brock, W.H. (1992), The Fontana History of Chemistry, Londres: Fontana Press.
Cohen, I.B. (1985), Revolution in Science, Harvard: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Conant, J.B. (1948), “The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory: The Chemical Revolution of 1775–1789”, en Conant, J.B. y L.K. Nash (eds.), Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science, vol. I, Case 2, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp. 65-115.
Díez, J.A. y C.U. Moulines (1997/1999), Fundamentos de Filosofía de la Ciencia, Barcelona: Ariel.
Estany, A. (1990), Modelos de cambio científico, Barcelona: Crítica.
Feyerabend, P.K. (1962), “Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism”, en Feyerabend, P.K., Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method. Philosophical Papers, Vol. I, Part 1, Chapter 4, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 44-96.
Feyerabend, P.K. (1977), “Changing Patterns of Reconstruction”, The British Journal for the Phi-losophy of Science 28: 351-369.
Kamlah, A. (1984), “A Logical Investigation of the Phlogiston Case”, en Balzer, W., Pearce, D. y H.-J. Schmidt (eds.), Reduction in Science, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 217-238.
Kitcher, P. (1978), “Theories, Theorists, and Theoretical Change”, The Philosophical Review 87: 519-547.
Kitcher, P. (1982), “Implications of Incommensurability”, Philosophy of Science Association 2: 689-703.
Kitcher, P. (1993), The Advancement of Science. Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, T.S. (1962/1970), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, T.S. (1976), “Theory-Change as Structure-Change: Comments on the Sneed For-malism”, Erkenntnis 10: 179-199.
Kuhn, T.S. (1983), “Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability”, Philosophy of Science Association 2: 669-688.
Laudan, L. (1977), Progress and Its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Lorenzano, P. (2008), “Inconmensurabilidad teórica y comparabilidad empírica: el caso de la genética clásica”, Análisis Filosófico 28: 239-279.
Moulines, C.U. (1982), Exploraciones metacientíficas, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, Madrid.
Moulines, C.U. (1984), “Ontological Reduction in the Natural Sciences”, en Balzer, W., Pearce, D. y H. J. Schmidt (eds.), Reduction in Science, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 51-70. Moulines, C.U. (1991), Pluralidad y recursión. Estudios epistemológicos, Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Moulines, C.U. (2000), “Is There Genuinely Scientific Progress?”, en Jonkisz, A. y L. Koj (eds.), On Comparing and Evaluating Scientific Theories, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 72: 173-197.
Niiniluoto, I. (1980), “Scientific Progress”, Synthese 45: 427-464.
Partington, J.R. (1962), A History of Chemistry, vol. III, Londres: Macmillan and Company Limited.
Perrin, C.E. (1988), “The Chemical Revolution: Shifts in Guiding Assumptions”, en Dono-van, A., Laudan, L. y R. Laudan (eds.), Scrutinizing Science. Empirical Studies of Scientific Change, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 105-124.
Spector, M. (1978), Concepts of Reduction in Physical Science, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Stegmüller, W. (1976), The Structure and Dynamics of Theories, New York: Springer-Verlag.
Stegmüller, W. (1979), The Structuralist View of Theories, New York: Springer-Verlag.
Thagard, P. (1992), Conceptual Revolutions, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2011 Metatheoria – Journal of Philosophy and History of ScienceThe documents published here are governed by the licensing criteria
Creative Commons Argentina.Atribución - No Comercial - Sin Obra Derivada 2.5 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
