Metatheoria – Journal of Philosophy and History of Science

Review of Suárez, J. and E. A. Lloyd, Units of Selection, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023, 112 pp.

2025-07-17T22:35:11+00:00

METAFÍSICA DAS LEIS, PODERES CAUSAIS E DEFESA INDUTIVISTA DO REALISMO CIENTÍFICO

2025-03-26T18:04:04+00:00

Review of Suárez Tomé, D., Belli, L. F. and A. Mileo (Eds.), Epistemología feminista, Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 2024, 255pp.

2025-07-17T22:42:14+00:00

Review of Ghins, M., Scientific Realism and Laws of Nature: A Metaphysics of Causal Powers, Cham: Springer (Synthese Library, vol. 483), 2024, 224 pp.

2025-07-17T22:44:53+00:00

Λóγος and Loveliness: Two Philosophical Concepts to Elucidate the Notion of “Inference to the Best Explanation”

2025-07-17T22:22:00+00:00

The article analyzes the notion of “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IME), initially proposed by Gilbert Harman and later developed by Peter Lipton. The IME suggests that, based on certain data and background beliefs, the most satisfactory explanation is inferred. Lipton introduces two key criteria for this selection: “likeliness” and “loveliness.” Likeliness relates to truth, while loveliness refers to the potential understanding that an explanation offers. Often, the most probable explanation is not the most illuminating; conversely, an explanation with high explanatory charm may not be the most probable. This underscores the need for a proper elucidation of the notion of “loveliness” to better understand how the IME functions. This work proposes to connect Lipton’s loveliness with the Greek concept of “λógos” as used by Plato in some of his dialogues. It is argued that this linkage is a promising way to regain objectivity in the application of the IME, thus addressing Hungerford’s classic objection regarding the apparent subjectivity involved in selecting the best explanation. Finally, the convenience of crossing the notions of λógos and “loveliness” through what Plato called “causal explanations” (αιτíσς λογισμóς) is justified.

Examination of the Theoretical Stage of Wells and Matthews’ Model of Emotional Self-Regulation: Methodological Aspects

2025-07-17T22:26:34+00:00

This research examines the theoretical stage of the self-regulatory executive function model of the emotional state of Wells and Matthews (1994) from the metascientific criteria proposed by Bunge (2000). Specifically, the investigation will confirm whether the model has internal consistency, external consistency, heuristic power, and coherence with the present scientific conception of the world. To these objectives, various analysis techniques have been proposed and assessed, one for each object of study. The following methods were used: the formalization of the model as a method of theoretical reconstruction, the observation of the theoretical correspondence between the model and the cognitive ontological sublevel of Bunge's theory of mind (2012), the explanation of theses about voluntary acts by Libet (1985) and Libet et al. (1983), and the observation of the theoretical and textual references of the model to the neurological and psychosocial ontological sublevels in Bunge's aforementioned theory of mind. Jointly, the results obtained show that the model presents an ideal state of theoretical maturity since it completely meets the aforementioned metascientific criterium―only partially the ontological consistency. This paper emphasizes the methodological aspects of the investigation because the method and analytical procedure used here can be useful for evaluating other various models and theories from any scientific field.

Denis Noble’s Philosophy of Biology

2025-07-17T22:30:33+00:00

This article provides an introduction to Denis Noble’s philosophy of biology. The “passive Darwinism” derived from the gene-centered perspective on evolution considers that the agency exhibited by living organisms is an apparent phenomenon, whose true causes are molecular or genetic. In contrast, Denis Noble defends an “active Darwinism” based on two principles: (1) the anti-reductionist principle, according to which higher levels of organization in biological systems can constrain lower levels, and their agency is therefore not reducible to that of the latter; (2) the relativist principle of biology, which more generally denies the existence of a privileged level of causation in biological systems. Framed within the organicist tradition, Noble’s “biology beyond the genes” offers a reconceptualization of biological systems that shifts the explanatory focus from the primacy of genes to a more dynamic and reciprocal conception of causal interactions between levels of biological organization.