Unobservables in the Philosophy of Science
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me16.415Keywords:
theoretical unobservables, formal unobservables, natural unobservables, philosophy of scienceAbstract
A heated debate among philosophers of science revolves around the existence or non-existence of what are generically called “unobservable entities” postulated by successful scientific theories. In this article, we propose dividing unobservables into three distinct categories: theoretical ones, which depend on theories; formal ones, which respond to the reification of the results of logical-mathematical tools; and natural ones, whose existence is directly evidenced by their observable effects. With these distinctions, we assume that it will be possible to clarify that there are clear ontological and epistemic differences among unobservables that, in general, have gone unnoticed in philosophical discussion. We assume, however, that this classification could help provide a more precise conceptual framework for evaluating the role of unobservables in the construction of scientific theories and reframing the philosophical debate between realisms, structuralisms, and anti-realisms.
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