The Freudian Theory of Hysteria. A Nominalist Reconstruction
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me6.243Keywords:
Freud, hysteria, psychoanalysis, metatheoretical structuralism, physicalism, nominalismAbstract
Dora, an 18-years young girl, goes with her father to Freud’s clinic, because of several close to disabling signs and symptoms: “tussi nervosa”, aphonia, appendicitis attacks, etc. that Freud diagnoses as hysteria. During the treatment, he discovers that Dora has full knowledge of human sexuality, even of so-called perversions. She is in love with Mr. K, with Mrs. K, probably with her own father, she has intense relationships with other females, and she dreams with houses that catch fire. While retelling their interviews, Freud builds his psychoanalytical conception of hysteria. From that material ― and following the distinctions of the structuralist view ― I extract its components and fundamental laws, using them to describe Dora and the other cases of hysteria that resemble this paradigmatic case. This reconstruction of the Freudian theory of hysteria is carried without using ― or starting with ― the description of abstract mathematical structures, as usually happens in structuralism. Briefly, it is a reconstruction of the applications of the theory that complies with all the usual requirements of a structural analysis. In this way I solve some ontological tensions of this conception, showing that it can be developed with an ontological and epistemological monism proper of a physicalist and nominalist approach.
References
Appignanesi, L. y J. Forrester (2000), Freud’s Women, London: Penguin Books.
Balzer, W. y P. Marcou (1989), “A Reconstruction of Sigmund Freud’s Early Theory of the Unconscious”, en Westmeyer, H. (ed.), Psychological Theories from a Structuralist Point of View, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer, pp. 13-31.
Balzer, W., Moulines, C. U.y J. D. Sneed (1987), An Architectonic for Science–The Structuralist Program, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Versión castellana de Pablo Lorenzano: Una arquitectónica para la ciencia. El programa estructuralista, Bernal:Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 2012.)
Brambrough, R. (1966) “Universals and Family Resemblance”, en Pitcher, G. (ed.), Wittgenstein, New York: Anchor Books, pp. 186-205.
Carnap, R. (1956),“Empiricism, Semantics,and Ontology”, en Carnap, R., Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2ª ed. aumentada, pp. 205-221.
Carnap, R. (1958), “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”, en Feigl, H. y M. Scriven (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. I, Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 38-76.
Díez, J.A. y C.U. Moulines (1997), Fundamentos de filosofía de la ciencia, Barcelona: Ariel.
Field, H. (1980), Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Oxford: Blackwell.
Frege, G. (1892), “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik100: 25-50.(Versión inglesa: “On Sense and Reference”, en Geach, P. and M. Black (eds.), Translations fromthe Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960, 2aed., pp. 56-78.)
Frege, G. (1918-1919), “Der Gedanke. Einelogische Untersuchung”, Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deustchen IdealismI: 58-77.(Versión inglesa de Anthony M. y Marcelle Quinton: “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”, Mind65(259) (1956): 289-311.)
Freud, S. (1893), “Quelques considérations pour une étude comparative des paralysies motrices organiques et hystériques”, Archives de Neurologie26(77): 29-43.
Freud, S. (1948a), Obras completas, Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.
Freud, S. (1948b), “Análisis fragmentario de una histeria”, en Freud (1948a, vol. II), pp. 513-566.
Freud, S. (2000), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works or Sigmund Freud (traducido del alemán bajo la dirección general de James Strachey en colaboración con Anna Freud, 24 vols.), New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Grünbaum, A. (1984), The Foundations of Psychoanalysis, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Goodman, N. y W.V. Quine (1947), “Towards a Constructive Nominalism”, Journal ofSymbolic Logic12: 105-122.
Goodman, N. (1972), Problems and Projects, Indianapolis/New York: The Babbs Merril Company, Inc.
Lorenzano, C. (1982), La estructura psicosocial del arte, México: Siglo XXI.
Lorenzano,C. (2001), “Teorías científicas, ontología y lenguaje”, en Sagüillo, J.M., Falguera, J.L. y C. Martínez (eds.), Teorías formales y teorías empíricas, Santiago de Compostela: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, pp. 623-637.
Lorenzano, C. (2002), “La estructura pragmática de la ciencia”, Comunicación al Tercer Encuentro Iberoamericano de Metateoría Estructuralista, Granada.
Moulines, C.U. (1982), Exploraciones metacientíficas,Madrid: Alianza.
Moulines, C.U. (1996), “Structuralism:The Basic Ideas”, en Balzer, W. y C.U. Moulines (eds.), Structuralist Theory of Science, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 1-13.
Moulines, C.U. (1998), “Esbozo de ontoepistemosemántica”, Theoria13(31): 141-159.
Nagel, T. (1965), “Physicalism”, Philosophical Review74(3): 339-356.
Neurath, O. (1931a), “Physicalism: The Philosophy of the Viennese Circle”, The Monist 41: 618-623.
Neurath, O. (1931b), “Physicalism”, Scientia50: 297-303.
Neurath, O. (1983), Philosophical Papers 1913-1946 (ed.y trad. Por Robert Cohen y Marie Neurath), Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel.
Peirce, C.S. (1966), “Letters to Lady Welby”, 31 Jan 1909, en Wiener, P.P. (ed.), Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings (Values in a Universe of Chance), New York: Dover, p. 406.
Rodríguez-Pereyra, G. (2000), Resemblance Nominalism. A Solution to the Problem of Universals, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sneed, J.D.(1971), The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Stegmüller, W. (1973), Theorienstrukturen und Theoriendynamik, Heidelberg: Springer.
Stegmüller, W. (1979), The Structuralist View of Theories,Berlin: Springer.
Suppes, P. (1960),“A Comparison of the Meaning and Usesof Models in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences”, en Suppes, P., Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science. Selected Papers from 1951 to 1969, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969, pp. 10-24.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958), Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1956), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2020 Metatheoria – Journal of Philosophy and History of ScienceThe documents published here are governed by the licensing criteria
Creative Commons Argentina.Atribución - No Comercial - Sin Obra Derivada 2.5 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
