Ten Metastructuralist Theses
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me5.239Keywords:
structuralism, reconstructions, metascience, meta-metatheoryAbstract
The purpose of this paper is to reflect on various aspects of structuralism as a meta-metatheoretical school within the framework of the semantic family, a reflection that has to do both with some external criticisms that it has received and with some internal shortcomings that deserve more attention than has been given to them by the structuralist community. These considerations, presented in the form of ten meta-metatheoretical theses, are addressed to a broad spectrum of interlocutors, from experts sympathetic to structuralism to radical critics who are almost ignorant of it, and from former disenchanted supporters to well-founded critics, moderate advocates, or neophytes with a reconstructive enthusiasm. If these reflections are correct, they should explain, at least partially, why although for many of us structuralism provides the best instrument for the analysis of scientific theories currently available, it has not received the attention it deserves from the community of philosophers of science.
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