The Concept of Life in Schelling’s Von der Weltseele

Abstract

Given the centrality that notions like organism and the organic have in Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, it seems in a first instance to respond to a typical definition of vitalism. This interpretation has several problems. Some of these stemming from the different views of how to characterize vitalism. Lemaitre (2013) demands that vitalists postulate an immaterial vital principle as the cause of organic life. Benton (1974) by contrast asserts that vitalism is the belief that there are forces, powers or principles, that are neither physical or chemical, and which affect living organisms or are possessed by them. These second view does not need the immateriality of the cause as a requisite. I argue that if we adopt Lemaitre’s view Schelling’s philosophy would not be vitalist, whereas under Benton’s view it would. Beyond the definitional issue, I engage in this paper in an analysis of Schelling’s view of Lifecentered on his 1798 work Von der Weltseele. I discuss from there to what extent can Schelling be considered a vitalist thinker.