Two Uses of Optimality Models in Natural Selection Explanations

Authors

  • Santiago Ginnobili Centro de Estudios de Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia (CEFHIC), Universidad Nacional de Quilmes (UNQ)/CONICET/Universidad de Buenos Aires
  • Ariel Roffé Centro de Estudios de Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia (CEFHIC), Universidad Nacional de Quilmes (UNQ)/CONICET/Universidad de Buenos Aires

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me8.161

Keywords:

optimality, natural selection, fitness, optimal foraging theory

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to analyze the relations between optimality models and natural selection. We contend that these relationships can be divided into two kinds, as there are two kinds of natural selection explanations, which we call “historical” and “ahistorical”. Historical explanations reveal how a given population acquires a trait which is adaptive in its environment, and involves many generations, variations, etc. Ahistorical ones, explain why, at a given moment, certain kinds of organisms have a greater reproductive success than others. We show that optimality models can play a role in determining the explanandumof historical selectionist explanations, that is, they help us to recognize which traits are adaptive. And, on the other hand, that optimality models sometimes allow us to determine part of the explanansof ahistorical explanations (particularly, the concept of fitness).

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Published

2017-10-01

How to Cite

Ginnobili, S., & Roffé, A. (2017). Two Uses of Optimality Models in Natural Selection Explanations. Metatheoria – Journal of Philosophy and History of Science, 8(1), 43–55. https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me8.161