Sobre el anti-realismo de Wittgenstein y su aplicación al programa chomskiano

Autores/as

  • Sergio Mota Departamento de Psicología Básica, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me4.125

Palabras clave:

anti-realismo, Wittgenstein, Chomsky, representación mental, mente

Resumen

El objetivo principal de este trabajo es mostrar un mapa conceptual en el que situar a Wittgenstein dentro de las distintas concepciones acerca de la lógica y la matemática. Después analizaré cómo se puede aplicar su concepción de la matemática al formalismo. Por último, analizaré el procedimiento mecánico finito definido por Chomsky y su relación con las nociones de mente y de representación (mental) dentro del marco conceptual expuesto previamente.

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Publicado

2014-04-01

Cómo citar

Mota, S. (2014). Sobre el anti-realismo de Wittgenstein y su aplicación al programa chomskiano. Metatheoria – Revista De Filosofía E Historia De La Ciencia, 4(2), 35–51. https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me4.125

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