Los modelos y la ficción

Autores/as

  • Roman Frigg Departamento de Filosofía, Lógica y Método Científico de la London School of Economics and Political Science

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me7.254

Palabras clave:

modelos, ficción, pretensión, verdad en la ficción, concepción semántica de las teorías, concepción estructuralista de los modelos

Resumen

La   mayoría  de  los   modelos  científicos   no   son  objetos  físicos  y esto origina cuestiones importantes. ¿Qué clase de entidad son los modelos?, ¿qué es la verdad en un modelo? Y ¿cómo aprendemos sobre los modelos? En este escrito, argumento que los modelos tienen importantes aspectos en común con la ficción literaria y que, por tanto,  las  teorías  de  la  ficción pueden  aplicarse  a estas  cuestiones.  En  particular, argumento que la teoría de la simulación como la desarrolla Walton (1990, Mimesis as Make-believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) tiene los recursos para  responder  a  estas  cuestiones.  Introduzco  esta  explicación,  perfilo las respuestas  que  ofrece  y  desarrollo  una  imagen general  del modelado científico basado en ella.

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Publicado

2016-10-01

Cómo citar

Frigg, R. (2016). Los modelos y la ficción. Metatheoria – Revista De Filosofía E Historia De La Ciencia, 7(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me7.254