Truth and Relevancy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me7.150Palavras-chave:
semantics, Bunge, science, truth, relevancyResumo
There are several types of truths. In this paper I focus on semantic truths, and within these on factual truths. These truths are attributed to statements. I review the theory of the truth proposed by Bunge and discuss some problems that it presents. I suggest that a theory of truth of factual statements should be complemented by a theory of relevance, and propose the basic tenets of it. Finally, I briefly discuss the nature of propositions and the problem of scientific truth in the light of the presented semantic theory.
Referências
Bunge, M. (1967), Foundations of Physics, Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer.
Bunge, M. (1974a), Treatise on Basic Philosophy I. Sense and Reference,Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Bunge, M. (1974b), Treatise on Basic Philosophy II. Interpretation and Truth, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Bunge, M. (2010), Mind and Matter, Heidelberg: Springer.
Bunge, M. (2012), “The Correspondence Theory of Truth”, Semiotica188: 65-76.
Burgess, A.G. and J.P. Burgess (2013),Truth, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kirkham, R.L. (1995), Theories of Truth, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Mosteller, T.M. (2014), Theories of Truth, New York and London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Romero, G.E. (2014), “The Collapse of Supertasks”, Foundations of Science19: 209-2016.
Russell, B. (1940), Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, New York: W.W. Norton.
Smith, N.J.J. (2008), Vagueness and Degrees of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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