Avanzar demasiado rápido: la elaboración de una hipótesis ad hoc

Autores/as

  • Sarah L. Scott Department of Philosophy, John Jay College of Criminal Justice.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me2.62

Palabras clave:

teoría, modificación, evidencia, metodología

Resumen

Una disputa científica puede girar crucialmente sobre si una hipótesis es ad hoc o no. Así, es extremadamente importante determinar qué hace ad hoc a una hipótesis. Sin embargo, los tratamientos previos han fracasado o bien debido a que se han visto entremezclados con el problema de Quine-Duhem o bien debido a otros defectos mayores.

Desarrollo un tratamiento novedoso de la ad hocidad. Propongo que una hipótesis es ad hoc cuando evidencia disconfirmatoria lleva a los científicos a aceptar esa hipótesis en su teoría, aun cuando el núcleo de la teoría, en combinación con las hipótesis auxiliares y la evidencia, no implican la hipótesis.

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Publicado

2011-10-01

Cómo citar

Scott, S. L. (2011). Avanzar demasiado rápido: la elaboración de una hipótesis ad hoc. Metatheoria – Revista De Filosofía E Historia De La Ciencia, 2(1), 37–60. https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me2.62

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