Contribuciones estructuralistas - ¿y limitaciones? - al estudio de la reducción científica

Autores/as

  • John Bickle Department of Philosophy and Religion, Department of Psychology, Institute for Imaging and Analytical Technologies (I2AT), Mississippi State University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me2.71

Palabras clave:

estructuralismo, reducción, práctica, cognición

Resumen

El estructuralismo ofrece recursos útiles para avanzar en la comprensión de la relación de reducción interteórica y su lugar en la historia de la ciencia. Este artículo comienza con la topografía de estos recursos y la evaluación de su importancia metacientífica. Sin embargo, quedan aún retos importantes. Cierro el artículo con el argumento de que el reduccionismo implícito en la práctica científica actual en un campo científico reduccionista paradigmático –“cognición molecular y celular”– se entiende mejor en un modelo de “intervención y realización de seguimiento de” y no como algún tipo de relación interteórica. Ilustro mi modelo alternativo al describir brevemente un resultado reciente de reducción en ese campo. Parece dudoso que alguno de los recursos estructuralistas iluminen este nuevo-tipo reconocido de reducción-en-la práctica-científica-real.

Citas

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Publicado

2012-04-01

Cómo citar

Bickle, J. (2012). Contribuciones estructuralistas - ¿y limitaciones? - al estudio de la reducción científica. Metatheoria – Revista De Filosofía E Historia De La Ciencia, 2(2), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me2.71

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