The Materialist Commitment of Cognitive Ethology
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me16.441Keywords:
cognition, behavior, cognitive ethology, physicalism, mindAbstract
Although described in a language other than that of physiology, the mental phenomena, processes, and states that cognitive ethology seeks to identify and analyze are inscribed in the same materiality in which physiological phenomena are inscribed. This paper aims to argue that these phenomena, processes, and mental states are states of an organism that, besides affecting one another, also interact with the other states of that same organism, thereby predisposing and enabling it to behave in certain ways. Usually, however, the map of causal relationships linking these states and processes to one another, or to the behaviours they govern, is given to us in a language that refers to mental states, cognitive processes and behavioural responses, rather than to physiological states, processes and responses.
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