Λóγος and Loveliness: Two Philosophical Concepts to Elucidate the Notion of “Inference to the Best Explanation”
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me15.380Keywords:
likeliness, loveliness, logos, inference to the best explanationAbstract
The article analyzes the notion of “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IME), initially proposed by Gilbert Harman and later developed by Peter Lipton. The IME suggests that, based on certain data and background beliefs, the most satisfactory explanation is inferred. Lipton introduces two key criteria for this selection: “likeliness” and “loveliness.” Likeliness relates to truth, while loveliness refers to the potential understanding that an explanation offers. Often, the most probable explanation is not the most illuminating; conversely, an explanation with high explanatory charm may not be the most probable. This underscores the need for a proper elucidation of the notion of “loveliness” to better understand how the IME functions. This work proposes to connect Lipton’s loveliness with the Greek concept of “λógos” as used by Plato in some of his dialogues. It is argued that this linkage is a promising way to regain objectivity in the application of the IME, thus addressing Hungerford’s classic objection regarding the apparent subjectivity involved in selecting the best explanation. Finally, the convenience of crossing the notions of λógos and “loveliness” through what Plato called “causal explanations” (αιτíσς λογισμóς) is justified.
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