The Hierarchy of Virtues as an issue to the Inference to the Best Explanation: a critical examination of “Inference to the Best Explanation: A Brief Defense”
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me12.345Keywords:
inference to the best explanation, explanatory virtues, scientific realismAbstract
In the latest edition of Metatheoria (Vol. 12, No. 1, 2021), Víctor Alfonso Costeño Chilaca published a fruitful article in which he explains the essence of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) and how criticisms directed towards this inferential model can be satisfactorily addressed. The author underscores the significant role played by “explanatory virtues” for the proper application of IBE. However, despite the great work carried out to elucidate these philosophical aspects, a lingering challenge remains for IBE as characterized by Costeño Chilaca: How to prioritize the degrees of relevance of explanatory virtues to prevent IBE from becoming a trivial reasoning?
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