On the Idea of A Formal Constitutive A Priori in Carnap’s Aufbau
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me1.34Keywords:
a priori, constitutive, Carnap, AufbauAbstract
With some exceptions, the contemporary interpretations about the a priori, clearly influenced by Coffa, have emphasized that which Coffa himself had called the “semantic” aspect of such a notion, i.e., the idea that what the a priori principles constitute is the meaning of the terms that make up a linguistic framework. Carnap’s position has been among those that have been viewed from that viewpoint. In this paper I will propound that at the Aufbau, Carnap develops a conception about the a priori closer to the original Kantian point of view, namely, the idea of the a priorilike constitutive of experience. Likewise, Carnap’s novel position lies in that, according to his point of view, those principles are essentially formal. To finish, I will recommend a point of view about the topic inspired in these ideas of Carnap’s.
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