Michael Ruse’s Ethics and Metaethics: From Altruism to Error Theory

Abstract

This work’s central objective is to analyze the evolutionary position proposed by Michael Ruse regarding ethics in the scope of first and second order. To fulfill this objective, we will initially distinguish Ruse’s evolutionary position, with Darwinian foundations, with the classical evolutionary position, with Spencerian foundations. We will show how Ruse initially reformulates Spencerian evolutionary ethics, making the scope of substantive ethics descriptive, and no longer prescriptive, based on the correct understanding of the concept of altruism. Within the scope of metaethics, we will show how Ruse develops an evolutionist position without falling back into the classic problems of Hume’s law and the naturalistic fallacy. Finally, we will show that Ruse’s Darwinian metaethics can be considered as a type of error theory. We will conclude that Ruse’s proposal of Darwinian ethics and metaethics bring great advances to the discussion, strengthening the importance of biology in the traditionally philosophical investigation.