On External Realism. A Study about John Searle

Abstract

This paper is a defense of Searle’s position on realism. Searle believes that there are two kinds of facts, the brute facts, and social and institutional facts. While the first ― such as mountains and seas ― are independent of the observer, the second ― Universities and hammers ― have a different ontological status; these are human creations. The only access to both kinds of facts is, however, through language. To achieve a better understanding to the perspective of Searle, will raise certain dialogues with various positions, such as the Putnam’s internal realism, Goodman’s anit-realism and Dummett’s semanticism. After presenting some possible discussion we will revalue Searle’s external realism position, which holds that in order to generate statements about the world, we must accept that there is a world outside of my representations and language.