Natural Selection and Massive Modularity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me8.173Keywords:
cognitive modularity, natural selection, time construal, intuitive mathematicsAbstract
Massive modularity, the theory of human architecture according to which during the evolution of cognition natural selection mainly produced massive-type modules, is denied. After depicting massive modularity of cognition, I recall some of its critics. Then, I consider two cases of cognitive capabilities: a very basic one, time construal, and a complex one, mathematization. I show how these skills cannot be explained on the grounds of massive modularity. As I will show, we have strong reasons to discourage the pursuit of evolutionary accounts for all and every cognitive capacity we currently accomplish, thus contradicting massive modularity central assumption.
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