False Models in Science: A Valuable Resource for the Understanding of Phenomena
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me8.165Keywords:
scientific understanding, explanation, scientific models, false modelsAbstract
In model - based sciences, like biology, models play a fundamental and indispensable explanatory role. In recent years, some authors have pointed out that the notion of understanding could shed light on the analysis of scientific explanation based on models. This notion has attracted growing attention in philosophy of science, particularly in philosophy of biology. Three central questions have been raised in the debate: (1) What is scientific understanding?; (2) is understanding factive, i.e., does understand ing presuppose or imply truth of the beliefs involved?; and (3) can understanding be objective? In this paper I will focus on question (2), taking as an assumption the answer to question (1) offered by Catherine Elgin. I will argue that understanding is no t factive when considering the use of false models - it does not imply accepting the beliefs involved as true. I will distinguish four types of false models according to the role that falsity plays in their explanatory function and I will argue that these false models are very useful tools for the understanding of phenomena and that their use is frequent in biology.References
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