Affordances as Ontologic and Epistemic Tools in the Demarcation of Cognitive Systems from Situated Approaches
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me5.138Keywords:
affordance, situated cognition, social cognition, extended mind, emergencyAbstract
In this work I pretend, in the first part, to give an account of certain demarcations that surge when we understand cognition in a situated way, specially in an ecological posture. For that I intend to explain briefly the implications of talking about situated cognition and also understanding the separation between the extended and enculturated postures of cognition; explaining in ontologicaland epistemic terms the consequences that imply taking one or the other as a theory to explain cognition. In the second part, I will propose affordance as an epistemic and ontological tool to explain phenomena that take place precisely in the diffuse frontiers between the cognitive systems and the environment, explaining some historic ways of understanding the term and favoring a relational posture that allows a good applicationfor understanding cognitive phenomena, in particular perception and social cognition.
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