Sobre explicar todo


  • Diana Taschetto University of São Paulo, FFLCH-USP


Palabras clave:

teorías de muchos mundos, Cosmología, supuestos metafísicos, leyes de la física, leyes de la naturaleza, explicación científica


Este trabajo explora temas de fundamentos relacionados con las teorías de muchos mundos en la Cosmología. Se argumenta que el cuadro metafísico dibujado por estas teorías surge de los supuestos metafísicos hechos durante su formulación, la mayoría de los cuales son problemáticos. Elucidaré la naturaleza de estos supuestos y examinaré su legitimidad. Concluyo que las presuposiciones metafísicas responsables de la aparente fiabilidad de las teorías de muchos mundos en la cosmología no están motivadas y no están justificadas por la evidencia. Sobre esta base, las cuestiones que los modelos de muchos mundos en la cosmología intentan resolver resultan ser un fracaso porque su supuesto fundamento metafísico está mal fundado.


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Cómo citar

Taschetto, D. (2019). Sobre explicar todo. Metatheoria – Revista De Filosofía E Historia De La Ciencia, 9(2), 111–126.